The recent trend of outsourcing network functions, aka. middleboxes, raises confidentiality and integrity concern on redirected packet, runtime state, and processing result. The outsourced middleboxes must be protected against cyber attacks and malicious service provider. It is challenging to simultaneously achieve strong security, practical performance, complete functionality and compatibility. Prior software-centric approaches relying on customized cryptographic primitives fall short of fulfilling one or more desired requirements. In this paper, after systematically addressing key challenges brought to the fore, we design and build a secure SGX-assisted system, LightBox, which supports secure and generic middlebox functions, efficient networking, and most notably, lowoverhead stateful processing. LightBox protects middlebox from powerful adversary, and it allows stateful network function to run at nearly native speed: it adds only 3µs packet processing delay even when tracking 1.5M concurrent flows.
INTRODUCTION
Middleboxes prevail in modern network; they undertake critical network functions for performance, connectivity, and security [14, 31, 53] . A paradigm shift of migrating software middlebox to professional service provider is taking place, for the enormous promised benefits [3, 10, 16, 53, 61] . Along with this exciting move, alike a lot of other outsourcing practice, are the everlasting concern on the confidentiality and integrity of data and computation. Such security concerns have drawn wide attention, while solutions have been proposed to protect the privacy of middlebox data (e.g., rules, state) [25, 55, 56] , both data and packet [6, 31, 50, 54, 65] , and the correctness of outsourced network functions [14, 64] .
However, due to the diverse and intricate nature of network functions (e.g., firewalling, load balancing, and intrusion detection), as well as the stringent networking requirements (e.g., packet delay on a magnitude of 10µs), addressing the security issues never comes as an easy task. On the premise of strong security, at the heart of a genuinely practical solution is performance, as computational overhead is the immediate price paid for security; also critical are the supported middlebox functionality, and the provided compatibility with existing architecture and deployment. A quick retrospect of latest arts. Previous works fall short of one or more expectations from above aspects. The firewall rule anonymization/obfuscation techniques designed in [25, 55] use nonstandard cryptographic tools, and they do not protect packet. The highly customized privacy-preserving DPI protocols proposed in [54] obtain guaranteed security from searchable encryption, but have expensive session setup cost, and suffer from excessive communication overhead due to payload tokenization. A follow-up design [31] proposes a header encryption scheme for efficient prefix search. Its combination with the secure pattern matching scheme developed in [54] can securely outsource a broader class of, though still restricted, network functions.
All aforementioned works impose moderate to significant modifications to the underlying middlebox, and thus non-trivial deployment effort for accommodating these changes. This is mainly due to their heavy use of cryptographic primitives and ad hoc software-based designs. For the same reason, they can hardly slash the incurred large performance overhead with pure engineering effort; meanwhile, none of them provides both confidentiality and integrity guarantees. We hereby argue that such software-centric approach is unlikely to be practically deployable in the near market, unless with significant advance in foundational research.
On the other hand, hardware-assisted design is gaining popularity [14] , especially with recent advance and commoditization of Intel SGX [37] , which features a secure enclave environment for running critical code over sensitive data. The capability of running generic code at native speed, and with strong security guarantee, has placed SGX atop other security enhancement solutions. It is envisioned in [29, 50] that SGX-aware middlebox can intercept encrypted communication session on the path, decrypt traffic inside enclave and process packets in the clear. However, their envisioned high-level designs leave a lot of practical challenges obscure. Our stance and contributions. In this paper, we take the stance that SGX is an ideal starting point to devise a practical solution for secure middlebox, however, it can only be realized after all key challenges brought to the fore are addressed.
The foremost challenge is: how to make a complex middlebox SGX-aware in the first place? Some common functionalities, e.g., system calls, are forbidden in SGX; hence, it is not immediately clear which parts of middlebox are portable to enclave. Delicate design considerations have to be sought for appropriate porting that preserves generality and security. The second concrete challenge is: how can SGX-assisted middlebox handle packet I/O and low-level networking logic with minimal overhead? Middlebox's network module normally deals with intensive packet I/O and basic networking logic such as packet retransmission and reordering. If ported to enclave, packet I/O must be done via secure API with nontrivial cost, followed by other potentially expensive networking operations (see §4.3.1). The networking can easily become a performance bottleneck if treated improperly. The third and most subtle challenge is: how can in-enclave stateful middlebox processing cope with practically high network traffic volume? It is not uncommon for middlebox to track millions of flow states concurrently, while the available secure memory in SGX (or other commodity trusted hardware) has a very conservative physical limit, i.e., 128M in the latest generation of Intel SGX-enabled product line (see §2.3). Although secure paging between enclave and main memory is supported by SGX, it is prohibitively expensive for the use of middlebox. For instance, 1ms per-packet delay will be added when handling 1M flows (see § 7.3.2). In-enclave middlebox can hardly be made practical without this major obstacle fully addressed.
We hereby present our built system, LightBox, which systematically addresses above challenges:
• We carefully identify four common structural components in typical middlebox implementation: initialization, network module, main routine and logging. Then, we give clear instructions for porting each of them to enclave with corresponding LightBox module in a security-preserving way. Any middlebox conforming to the identified generic structure, including popular ones like PRADS [15] , NAT64 [8] , HAProxy [46] and Snort [47] , can be migrated to SGX-assisted LightBox instance.
• We observe that middlebox's network module is not necessarily confined to enclave. Indeed, it is sound to remove it from enclave, without subverting the system's security. In this way, unmodified networking code can run in untrusted host program independent of remaining middlebox processing; only well-prepared packets are loaded to enclave. This isolation also brings greater flexibility in underlying packet I/O framework.
• We tackle the tension between SGX memory limit and middlebox memory hunger based on an important fact in real networks: although tremendous states may be accumulated in middlebox during run time, only a small portion of them are actively accessed at any instant. From a high level, we hierarchize the state data into a small in-enclave cache and a large encrypted in-memory dictionary. Our fine-rained caching design allows the enclaved stateful middlebox to run with marginal overhead most of the time.
Putting all essential designs together, LightBox enables secure middlebox of generic functionality to run at near-native speed. Our evaluation shows that with 8M cache, LightBox can drive PRADS at 10µs delay for 64B packets generated by 600K concurrent connections, and 3µs for header-only packets with 1.5M tracked flows. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We elaborate on requirements, promising technology, and key challenges in §2, followed by preliminaries in §3. The detailed design of LightBox is presented in §4, and its security is discussed in §5. We report our implementation and instantiation effort in §6, followed by comprehensive evaluations in §7. The paper is concluded in §9.
2 REQUIREMENTS, OPPORTUNITY, AND CHALLENGES 2.1 Requirements of secure and trustworthy middlebox outsourcing
The who impose requirement span the enterprises, as they must merit from the outsourcing practice anyway, the service providers, as they wish to provide competitive and hence profitable services, and the ISVs, as they want to minimize effort for product development and maintenance. Confidentiality and integrity. The packets should be protected for certain, because they usually carry sensitive information of the enterprise [54] . The middlebox processing rules/polices needs protection too, as they are normally proprietary in nature [31] , and may reveal the enterprise's network topology or other intellectual properties [64] . Also important are middlebox states maintained at runtime, since they may be exploited to infer a lot of valuable data [56] . Integrity is on a par with data confidentiality. Enterprises desire an assurance that their outsourced middlebox operates as expected, without being interfered by cyber attack like spurious advertisement injection [14] , or dishonest service providers for ill-gotten gains [64] . The integrity of both middlebox code and aforementioned data need to be protected. Performance. Modern network features packet processing delay within a few tens of µs. Security enhanced middlebox should conform to this performance baseline to be practically deployable. Existing systems inflate middlebox processing latency by hundreds of µs to hundreds of ms [6, 25, 54, 55, 65] , and the inflations are hard to reduce engineeringly, due to the fundamental limits in underlying cryptographic tools. Secure prefix matching can be done efficiently, but it only applies to the middlebox that processes over packet headers [31] . Apart from computation, a practical system should also account for communication overhead, which is directly related to operating cost in outsourcing service [2] . Systems excessively burdening bandwidth [6, 54, 65] are less desirable. Functionality. Middleboxes vary a lot in their semantics. Functions like header fields lookup/update and exact string matching over payload are relatively easy to handle, but advanced ones like regular expression matching and script-based actions, are difficult with current techniques [31, 54, 65] . Besides, most existing designs only consider stateless functions, while real-world middleboxes entails stateful processing. A desirable solution should cover a broad range of, if not all, middlebox functionalities. Compatibility. Most of the time, middleboxes are independently designed, implemented, deployed and maintained by academic communities or industrial companies [52] . A security design is hardly usable if it purports significant re-implementing of the boxes or rearchitecting of their deployment. Hence, compatibility constitutes another important requirement for a practical solution.
Opportunity from hardware enforced security
A variety of hardware architectures and respective system incarnations have been proposed for security critical application. Earlier mainstream techniques TPM [17] and TrustZone [32] either face critical vulnerability [19] , or suffer from unacceptable performance overhead [36] and restricted resources [60] . The watershed is marked by the emergence of SGX. Applications using SGX create a secure enclave environment guarded by on-chip security engines. Any attempts to access the enclave from outside will fail, be it from userspace, OS, hypervisor, and whatever privilege. That is, SGX limits TCB to the enclave and protects the confidentiality and integrity of anything inside it. The salient feature of SGX is that almost any userspace code can run in enclave at native speed, which distinguishes it from previous solutions. At first sight, SGX seems perfect for our problem, as it provides strong security, runs arbitrary code with small overhead, and is being commodified. A closer look into applying SGX in the specific context of networked middlebox systems, however, will reveal many unique challenges that have not been recognized by previous studies.
Challenges with SGX-assisted design
Making middlebox SGX-aware. The first and foremost challenge is how to port a middlebox system, which is generally complicated, to a SGX-aware application comprised of orchestrated trusted and untrusted partitions. There are preliminary studies on general partition schemes for securing application with SGX [7] . However, they give little instructional value in tackling concrete problem. The successful porting of middlebox must build on the deep understanding of its nature and practical implementation. Realizing efficient networking. Middlebox is an I/O intensive program. It continuously reads packets from network device, and writes them back after processing. Any I/O in SGX must be done through secure APIs with nontrivial overhead (see §3.4). Meanwhile, packet loss or out-of-order happen often in the network; they must be accounted by corresponding retransmission or reordering mechanisms at end points. Implementing packet I/O and low-level networking logic inside enclave drains limited SGX resource, e.g., excessive pending packets may be buffered there, and thus leads to severe performance issue. It can also cause unexpected events like hardware packet queue overflow. This forces us to rethink SGX-aware middlebox's networking design. Tackling middlebox memory hunger. SGX enclave carves out memory from Enclave Page Cache (EPC), which is limited reservation of physical memory. The documented EPC size is 128M, among which about 90M is usable to application while the rest is reserved for SGX drivers. Theoretically unlimited enclave memory is possible with secure paging between EPC and unprotected main memory, but the paging can incur overhead of orders of magnitude [5] . The overhead is reasonable because each paging operation involves encryption/decryption and hashing of swapped pages. Therefore, it can be concluded that 128M or 90M is literally a hard limit for applications chasing high performance. 1 Unlike switches/routers with simple forwarding/routing functionality, middleboxes are created for complex network functions that deal with various states. The most typical one is per-flow state, which ranges from tens of bytes in simple NAT [8] , a few kilobytes in advanced load balancer [46] , to tens of kilobytes or more in complicated IDS systems [44, 47] . On the other hand, modern middlebox normally needs to keep tracking a large number of, say hundreds of thousands of, network flows concurrently [18, 22] . In such case, Hence, it is fundamentally hard for SGX to support stateful processing in practical middlebox deployment.
SYSTEM PRELIMINARIES 3.1 Service model
We consider the well studied bounce model [31, 53] for traffic redirection: packets are redirected from enterprise gateway to remote middlebox, and bounced back after processing. We require the redirection to be reliable, i.e., packet loss and out-of-order are properly handled by the two ends. Our solution can be easily adapted to other service models, e.g., two gateways [31, 64] . The relatively simple bounce model allows us to focus on our core system designs.
Proprietary middlebox rules can be provided by third-party vendor, instead of enterprise itself [54] . In case of this, the vendor can securely provision the rules to LightBox's enclave during system setup. We skip the detail, since only standard SGX attestation and provision procedures are involved.
Adversary model
In line with SGX's security goal, we consider a powerful adversary model resident within the service provider's infrastructure, e.g., the cloud. We assume the adversary has supreme control over user programs, OS and hypervisor, as well as all hardware components in the machines, with one exception that it cannot physically manipulate the processor package.
The adversary can be passive or active. It can stealthily observe network traffic and memory data. It may also intercept program runtimes in memory, exploit vulnerability in the kernel, and freely log, replay, modify, and drop any network packets.
However, we do not consider threats or security limitations intrinsic to SGX or current computing architecture. These include 1) SGX page faults attack [63] , which is independently addressed in [57] ; 2) hardware-based side channel such as cache timing [34] and bus monitoring [62] , which is mitigated by dedicated solutions [30, 49] . Similar to in previous systems, denial-of-service and network inference attack are outside the scope of our system. Finally, we assume the enterprise gateway is trusted and it is not necessarily SGX enabled. Also, the middlebox developer, which could be the enterprise itself or ISVs, is trusted. Any bugs and vulnerability in middlebox implementation are also out of our interest.
Cryptographic primitives
Owning to the strong security guarantee of SGX, we need very few cryptographic tools: one standard symmetric encryption scheme plus one MAC scheme. We use Enc(·)/Dec(·), and Auth(·) to denote corresponding algorithms. A set of secret keys used by the schemes are shared between trusted parties during system initialization. We omit the keys in notation for brevity. We also utilize a cryptographic hash, denoted as Hash(·).
SGX programming model
We give a minimal introduction to SGX programming model to facilitate the understanding of our design decisions. A SGX application must be partitioned into at least two counterparts, a host for enclave management (e.g., creation, destruction, and communication) as well as noncritical code, and an enclave for running critical code over sensitive data. Current SGX SDK supports C/C++ for development. The host can be regarded as a normal program, while the enclave is deprived of many useful features like system calls, OS API, signals and linking shared objects.
The interaction between enclave and host can only be made through well-defined ECALL, for host to call enclave, or OCALL, for enclave to call host. Invoking EALL/OCALL requires a series of operations, including context switching, data marshaling, memory validation, cryptographic checking, etc., and hence non-negligible cost. In short, the set of ECALLs/OCALLs occupy a large portion of the design space for the application's security and performance.
DESIGN OF LIGHTBOX
In the rest of this paper, we regard middlebox as a userspace program, and LightBox instance as a SGX-aware application comprised of untrusted host and trusted enclave, running on a remote middlebox server. Note that we abuse the term "middlebox" a little bit, to indicate either the program or the server, when the indication is clear from the context. A LightBox instance works closely with an enterprise gateway. We blur the role of gateway and enterprise administrator for ease of presentation.
Overview
LightBox transforms a middlebox into a symbiosis of host and enclave bridged by four main modules, as illustrated in Fig.1 . The major processing code is shielded by enclave, where any operations forbidden there are performed by corresponding LightBox modules:
• Secure Admin (SAdmin) controls the initialization, termination and various management of the entire system. • Secure Ferry (SFerry) handles middlebox networking. It establishes a secure channel with gateway for traffic redirection.
• Secure State Exchanger (StateEx) enables efficient in-encalve stateful processing.
• Secure Logger (SLog) manages all logging-like operations of the system.
At system setup, the gateway remotely launches and attests the instance deployed at remote server. During the attestation it also runs key exchange protocol, e.g., Diffie-Hellman, with the just initialized SAdmin for sharing a couple of secret keys 2 . After that, a secure management channel is established between the two, through which a manifest carrying LightBox parameters, e.g., ferry size and memory specification, in addition to necessary configuration files, are shared. Given the manifest and configuration files, SAdmin can initialize other modules and kick off the system. At runtime, another secure redirection tunnel is established between the gateway and SFerry. The logic transmission unit in LightBox is ferry, which is essentially a batch of ordered packets plus some meta data. SFerry loads well-prepared ferries to enclave, where main function code runs on decrypted and validated packets. After processing, SFerry organizes ferries inside enclave, loads them to host, and then schedules them for transmission. The procedures will loop until system termination or fatal system failure.
Next, we show how to adapt a middlebox to an LightBox instance step by step, followed by details of critical technical components.
Porting middlebox to a SGX-aware application
Middleboxes are complex and sophisticated, so porting them into SGX-aware applications is not a easy task. Unlike [56] which uses SGX to protect only state and related operations, we aim to secure entire packet processing to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of packets, states, logs, and any other middlebox data. Hence, the first step is to scrutinize middlebox at the implementation level to see how the porting can be made possible. Dissecting middlebox structure. Despite their vast diversity, middleboxes share certain structural design in common [43] . For our sake, a middlebox can be broken down into the following four components:
• Initialization, which read system parameters, loads configuration files, etc. It executes only once upon system startup.
• Network module, which handles packet I/O and networking logic. It is the outermost of packet processing loop.
• Main routine, which constitutes the middlebox's primary functions, including headers parsing, payload inspection, etc.
• Logging, which prevails in a middlebox system and usually closely interweaves with the main routine. Note that our notion of logging encompasses essentially a broad class of middlebox behaviors, e.g., dump [15] , alert [47] , and alarm [44] . Except initialization, the other three components comprise the main loop in a middlebox system. After the dissection, it immediately follows that none of the components can be directly ported, because they all rely on SGX unsupported functionalities in some way. Roughly speaking, each of the components is tackled by one LightBox module. Next, we discuss them one by one. Initialization. Middlebox normally needs to load a few configuration files, including system parameters, processing policies (e.g., firewall rule, lookup table), and so on, during system startup. In LightBox, we require these files to be protected, which can be achieved through two approaches. The files can be kept at the trusted gateway, and only passed to SAdmin through the secure management channel during system setup; they are destroyed inside enclave after use. Alternatively, the files can be securely sealed and locally stored at the middlebox server via SGX's sealing utility.
Either way, the files are only decrypted by SAdmin inside the enclave, and fed to the middlebox's original initializers. The first approach is more desirable in practice. Sealing relies on monotonic counter stored in non-volatile memory to defend against replay attacks [12, 59] , but an enclave has limited quota of such counters [21, 68] , which is insufficient if a lot of files/data require protection. 3 Moreover, note that any update of configurations needs to be made through the secure management channel to ensure their confidentiality and integrity. If the sealing approach is used, the sealed configuration files must also be updated accordingly, which is unnecessary. Therefore, we adopt the first approach and eliminate any middlebox configuration files on the remote server. Network module. Packet I/O using PF_PACKET, libpcap or other frameworks, are prohibited in SGX. We must rely on OCALL to access network devices from within enclave. Clearly, it would be too costly to wrap each packet read/write in one OCALL. For better efficiency, one may choose to batch packet I/O [56] . But networking logic like packet reordering and retransmission are still left in enclave causing troubles. Our observation is that SGX-assisted middlebox's networking is indeed outside security-critical region. To this end, we propose to isolate the network module entirely from enclave, and delegate the task to SFerry, which acts as a relay agent that connects to network device at one end and enclave at the other. By doing so, we are able to construct a secure channel for packet redirection while retaining original middlebox's I/O performance. The design rationale and details are deferred to §4.3. Main routine and logging. These two are tightly coupled in middlebox implementation. The former runs middleboxes' main functions, e.g., rule matching for firewall, address translation/rewriting for NAT/LB, or payload inspection for IDS/IPS. These functions are mostly self-contained on their own, i.e., no dependency on privileged system calls or third-party libraries. Therefore, if logging is not a concern, they can be readily ported to enclave, where packets are processed in the clear as normal. However, logging requires extensive access to underlying OS and hence, non-trivial OCALLs. Simply invoking an OCALL for each operation may be too expensive. Our workaround is based on the observation that logging by nature does not demands instant completion nor high-resolution timing. In other words, it is feasible to "delay" the operations inside enclave, and periodically flush them to outside, resulting in constant and controllably small cost.
SLog module is designed for this purpose: it maintains a small buffer inside enclave, traps all logging operations, and organizes them into the buffer as log entries. The entry is composed of encrypted and authenticated log message, associated file descriptor, and timestamp that is the same for all current buffered entries, illustrated in Fig.2 . SLog flushes the entire buffer periodically, or in case it is full; with a proper flushing timeout, the latter case rarely happens. Alike configurations, there are two ways to sink the flushed logs: we can either store them on the middlebox server, which are checked by gateway at later time, or we can directly transfer them to gateway through the management channel. We let the practical use case to decide whichever is more suitable.
To this point, we have described how a middlebox can be ported into SGX enclave with the help of LightBox modules, in particular SAdmin and SLog. We detail the design of more sophisticated SFerry and StateEx in following sections, respectively.
Isolating network module from critical region and realizing secure redirection
According to our service model ( §3.1), traffics are tunneled from the gateway to middlebox using dedicated redirection headers, and the tunnel should be reliable. In what follows, we refer to the original packet simply as packet, and the tunneling packet as raw packet, which encapsulates the former as payload. Network module deals with raw packets. Inside enclave, the I/O must be made through OCALL, and for efficiency, it should be done in a batching manner.
Design rationale.
A naive approach would proceed as follow (for input, output is similar): the enclave invokes an OCALL, which in turns makes a sequence of I/O calls to network interface and buffers the received packets; as the OCALL returns, a batch of packets are copied to enclave and processed there.
Unfortunately, this naive approach may lead to severe issues. After the OCALL returns, the I/O is blocked until the enclave finishes processing the entire batch of packets and invokes next call; as a consequence, newly incoming packets may be undesirably discarded due to hardware queue overflow. From time to time, the enclave needs to signal the gateway for retransmission in case of packet loss; this, however, requires multiple OCALLs with unexpected cost increase. Packet reordering causes the same issue. Worse yet, implementing the low-level networking logic in enclave will eat up precious resource. For example a fair amount of protected memory may be used to buffer packets awaiting their lost/out-of-order peers; the batched processing further burden the enclave memory by buffering batches of packets.
The issues are essentially caused by the attempt to bind packet I/O and networking logic to enclave. Is it possible to isolate network module entirely from enclave to avoid the problems? The answer is in 5 affirmative, because real packets carrying sensitive information are always authenticated and encrypted, before being encapsulated in raw packets. In other words, running network module in untrusted host does not compromise confidentiality and integrity of packets.
4.3.2 Isolated network module and secure redirection. SFerry realizes the design goal. It performs packet I/O and networking logic on behalf of middlebox, and feeds only prepared raw packets to enclave. SFerry contains a pair of untrusted and trusted routine running in parallel, which are coordinated around a shared pool in main memory. The untrusted routine maintains persistent communication with network, and buffers received raw packets in the pool, thus addressing the concern of hardware queue overflow; meanwhile, the trusted routine ships the organized packets (still "raw" in our context, though) between the pool and protected memory, back and forth, at the host-enclave boundary (hence the name "ferry"). The redirection headers are stripped from the packets ferried to enclave. Fig.3 illustrates SFerry's work flow. Ferry-based transmission. The logical transmission unit in LightBox is ferry, which consists of a sequence of ordered raw packets with associated meta data, and can be realized by tagging the redirection header with a ferry id. Gateway organizes packets into ferries for transmission. At middlebox server, SFerry handles two directions:
• ingress, where ferries are reconstructed from raw packets received from network and then loaded to enclave; • egress, where packets finishing processing in enclave are organized into ferries, loaded to host, and sent to network.
The size of ferry, as a system parameter, is agreed upon by the two ends during system initialization. When handling ingress, SFerry will be aware of (raw) packet loss, once a pending ferry has been waited for too long and the number of received (raw) packets is still less than expected; in such case, it can notify the gateway for retransmission. We will not dig into the networking detail, and we assume that after a quick negotiation with gateway, SFerry is able to decide whether it is a normal packet loss; if not, the expected packet may have been tampered with or dropped by the adversary. The same treatment is applied at the gateway side. Secure redirection. Note, however, that we cannot assert the integrity of ferry by expecting correct receiving count, because the adversary can arbitrarily manipulate the unprotected header of raw packet. The integrity is guarded by a MAC computed over the ferry data as Auth(fid | Enc(p 1 ) | Enc(p 2 ) | · · · | Enc(p n )), where fid is ferry id, p i is the i-th packet, and n is ferry size. The MAC is included in ferry as meta data. For ingress, after loading a ferry to enclave, SFerry verifies its integrity and then decrypt the payload to recover the packets; for egress, SFerry encrypts and tunnels the packets, before loading them to host as a ferry. Note that the real packets are always encrypted and encapsulated as payload of raw packets, wherever outside enclave. At the other side, gateway does exact the same procedure for redirected traffic. In this way, a secure redirection channel is established between gateway and enclave, where confidentiality and integrity of packets are protected Remark. SFerry frees enclave from tedious packet I/O and networking logic, and thus lets these non-critical tasks to be done natively in host. Particularly, it allows the system to enjoy the latest advances in network I/O, e.g., DPDK [20] , without touching the core modules. In contrast, switching I/O framework involves much more effort for the naive approach, e.g., modifying related OCALLs and revalidation of the system's security.
Enabling secure and efficient stateful packet processing
Stateful processing is essential to middlebox, while it is also the biggest obstacle towards building practical SGX-secured middlebox system. The main reason is that the limited EPC cannot afford the large memory footprint required by stateful middlebox (see also §2.3). LightBox overcomes the obstacle with its salient module, StateEx. Hereafter, we focus on per-flow state, or simply flow state, which is the one that outnumbers other types of states [24] and overwhelms the memory as flows are accumulated. But the techniques we developed equally apply to any states. Flow state is normally represented by an ensemble of fixed-size fields such as total byte count, tcp flags, and timestamp of last received packet; the process of identifying a packet's flow and binding it with the associated state is referred to as flow tracking. There is also a special flow state, stream reassembly buffer, that is of varied size as the flow grows [44, 47] . We elaborate on our treatment for flow tracking and stream reassembly separately, after discussing important observations that have stimulated our design.
Observation and motivation.
Flow state must be maintained throughout the entire lifetime of flows, or until prescribed inactivity timeout; otherwise, the correctness and consistency of middlebox function cannot be guaranteed, e.g., suspicious packets, identified by specified occurrences of certain pattern, may be falsely let go due to premature termination of flow tracking session in an IDS. Flow expiration timeouts are typically set to at least a few 10s to accommodate varied network conditions, for example 30s in a renowned load balancer HAProxy, and 300s in our instantiated PRADS. As a result, within one expiration interval, the states of a tremendous amount of flows may be accumulated in memory.
Nevertheless, we notice some interesting fact about flow concurrency, which is defined as the number of active flows within a time window. We informally distinguish between two terms:
• instant concurrency, for small window, say < 1s, and • persistent concurrency, for large window, say > 10s; the former is more in the literal sense of "concurrency", while the latter corresponds to the timescale of flow expiration timeout. It turns out that although persistent concurrency can be very high, instant concurrency tends to be small and relatively stable. 50ms-window in 1-Gbps Ethernet [1] , and 100s-1000s with 5ms-window in 40-Gbps data centers [48] .
Above fact augurs well for a hierarchical design, which maintains a small state cache in the enclave for active flows, leaving a plethora of inactive flow states kept encrypted in main memory and swapped in on demand. The relative small and stable instance concurrency ensures that the provisioned cache can cater for most flows at any point of time, hence effectively relieving the tension between EPC limit and middlebox memory hunger. The effectiveness of this caching strategy is demonstrated in Fig.8 and Fig.9 .
Handling flow tracking.
Following conventions, we specify that a flow is identified by the 5-tuple, and specifically we defines: flowid = Hash(SrcIP,SrcPort,DstIP,DstPort,Protocol). Flow tracking always takes place in the very early stage of packet processing cycle. The flowid is computed from relevant header fields, and the identified flow state is usually binded to the packet, for instance by storing a pointer in the packet descriptor. The state may be read or updated anywhere in succeeding processing, so it must be cached in enclave right after flow tracking, to avoid frequent and unnecessary swapping. Once the state is cached, the major middlebox function can run at (nearly) native speed.
StateEx reserves a small pool of enclave memory, say 8M, to cache the states of active flows, and stores in main memory the states of a much larger portion of inactive flows. We call the former state cache, and the latter state stock. Inside the enclave, given a flowid, if it is found in the cache, we call it a hit, and otherwise a miss. Analogous to hardware memory hierarchy, cache hit implies the fastest path in flow tracking, where StateEx's tasks are mostly offloaded and the only thing to do is binding the state to packet; but in the face of cache miss, it has to 1) evict an entry from state cache and pop it out from enclave to state stock, 2a) swap in the addressed entry if the pending flowid is found in the stock, or 2b) create a new entry and key it with the flowid in the cache otherwise (in this case an empty/dummy entry is swapped in). StateEx encrypts and authenticates an entry before evicting it out, while verifies and decrypts an entry after swapping it in; hence, the entries are always protected in state stock residing in main memory.
StateEx removes entries of explicitly completed or terminated flows from state cache. Note that an entry can exist in either state cache or state stock, but not both, which is different from hardware memory hierarchy. We make this design to avoid flows that have been removed from state cache dangling in state stock: excessive dangling entries affects lookup performance in the stock, although they will eventually be treated as expired.
StateEx checks expired flows and purges them from state stock; this is realized by attaching to an entry the last receiving time of the flow. Flow expiration rarely happens in state cache, because unused cache entries will be kicked out very soon; even if this happened, it is fine to leave it in the cache without affecting performance. Cache replacement. We expect a high and stable cache hit rate to ensure flow tracking are done efficiently inside enclave. Apart from the characteristic of traffic itself, cache miss rate is also a key determiner of caching performance. A variety of cache replacement policies have been studied in the context of networked system or devices. Our stance is that the replacement policy must attain reasonably high and stable performance, with as simple algorithmic design as possible. According to our empirical evaluations, we have found LRU to be the desired one, consistent with previous observation [27] . StateEx implements LRU for state cache in a minimal yet effectual way: a bare linked list over entries in state cache is designed to track access lineage; newly accessed entry will be raised to the front, while entry at the rear is always the next one to be evicted. Bundle optimization. Each replacement asks for one OCALL, and so in one ferry, the number of OCALLs for flow tracking equals to the number of cache misses. Assume 90% hit rate and 1000 ferry size, then StateEx needs to make 100 OCALLs, which is still a considerable number. We can indeed minimize the number of OCALLs by what we called bundle optimization. The rationale is: the processing inside enclave is scheduled at the granularity of ferry, that is, early completed packets have to wait for their peers to be ferried out from the enclave together, anyway. So, instead of swapping entry immediately after a cache miss, StateEx can buffer multiple evicted entry and the paired pending flowid, and only swap them in a bundle in one OCALL. In fact, there is no harm to bundle the handling of all cache misses in a ferry, resulting in exactly one OCALL for flow tracking of the entire ferry. Note that bundle optimization requires slightly rearranging original middlebox's code flow, and so depending on the case, it might not be very suitable for states other than flow state that is tracked at the beginning. Fig.4 illustrates state swapping with and without bundle optimization. Remark. Alg. 1 gives the complete process of StateEx handling flow tracking. Note that the core procedure State Lookup realizes the generic function to exchange the state that is required for packet processing, between host and enclave, in case it is not found in the cache. It can be used for any middlebox states other than per-flow state, including but not limited to cross-flow state, global state, or even cross-instance state [24, 26] .
Handling stream reassembly.
Some middlebox function imposes processing over reassembled stream, rather than individual packet, for performance or security reason, e.g., the Stream preprocessor in Snort for anomaly detection [47] . Unlike normal flow state that are frequently read and updated throughout the functions, streams are generally featured by multiple appends and one read before being flushed. Hence, it is viable to keep the buffered streams, each of which can be as large as tens of kilobytes, outside enclave until the flushing, without burdening enclave memory.
StateEx allocates dedicated stream buffer in enclave for stream reassembly. The buffer is of the same size as ferry, hence very small (1-2MB) in practice. Alike state cache entry, the buffer indexes its item by FlowID. For each ferry loaded to enclave, StateEx encrypts and authenticates packet payloads and store them as items in the buffer. At the same time, it updates stream size field in corresponding state cache entry. The buffer is then moved out from enclave to the stream stock maintained by StateEx. Stream stock appends item to the entry indexed by FlowID; each stock entry contains a concatenation of encrypted stream segments.
When the stream-aware function notices the reassembled stream reaches preset size (via the state entry), it calls StateEx to flush the stream from the stock into enclave. By flushing we mean the stream entry is removed from the stock, and corresponding size field is reset to zero. StateEx ensures that the huge volume of buffered streams are securely kept in main memory, and they are loaded to enclave only on demand.
Discussion and Extension
Protecting code. LightBox protects all middlebox data, except the code itself that is installed on remote server. Nevertheless, code protection can be easily incorporated into the system, in a way similar to [51] . Specifically, instead of the entire system, only SAdmin is deployed to the remote server, and the rest modules can be handed over through the secure management channel during system setup. Upon system termination, the code is destroyed with the enclave. Integrated into service chain. Service function chaining is normally required in practical deployment [26] . LightBox concentrates on securing single middlebox, but it can be readily extended to cater for such service chain. Specifically, each middlebox instance in the chain is ported to a LightBox instance; similar to secure redirection tunnel, a secure packet transmission channel is established between any pair of connected instance; a secure management channel is constructed between gateway/central controller and each instance. Note that the design of StateEx can be seamlessly integrated into a distributed setting [24, 26] -simply replacing state stock with (encrypted) distributed state store, leaving state cache unchanged. Extrapolated to other applications. Many designs and techniques we developed in LightBox are of independent value, and they can find application scenarios beyond secured middlebox. For example, SFerry can be applied to applications that is I/O intensive and requires secure network communications; StateEx's fine-grained caching technique, and the philosophy behind, shall motivate the design of SGX-aware applications that has large memory footprint at runtime. Moreover, LightBox as a whole can be adapted to alternative use cases beyond middlebox outsourcing. For instance, it is a promising candidate for realizing middlebox processing over normal TLS traffic [29, 39] ; in this case, in lieu of gateway the communication end points establish secure channels with LightBox.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
LightBox's security is mainly established on SGX, which guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of code and data in the trusted enclave environment. Outside enclave and the trusted gateway, any data involved in middlebox processing are encrypted and authenticated with standard cryptographic tools. 8
Confidentiality. The original packets are transmitted through the secure redirection tunnel terminated at gateway and enclave; accessible to attacker, be it in network or service provider's infrastructure, are only encrypted packets tunneled with dedicated redirection header, while the header merely carries public network information of the gateway and middlebox server. Similarly, all configuration like system parameters, firewall policies and attack signatures, as well as log files, are either securely sealed on the server, or transmitted through the secure management channel; attackers cannot gain useful information about the middlebox processing from them. Finally, as the system's salient design, StateEx moves the vast majority of middlebox states out from enclave; the states are encrypted in main memory too, and they will be vanished upon system termination. Integrity. The integrity of all data is twinned with their confidentiality; every piece of encrypted data is also authenticated. Any adversarial attempts to manipulate or tamper with the packets, configurations or states, will be detected by the enclave or gateway. In addition, the integrity of middlebox processing itself is protected, because an adversary cannot access or intercept the code executing inside enclave. Meanwhile, the correct processing result, in the form of modified packet, updated state or log, can be verified by gateway after corresponding data leaves enclave. In this sense, LightBox achieves the verifiability proposed in [14] . Memory access pattern. Although our threat model is explicitly declared to be in line with SGX's intrinsic capability, we are aware of the growing attention on attack vector related to memory access pattern [58, 63, 67] . The clear data in enclave may be extracted via software side-channels [12, 63] . We note that our system can be augmented by existing solutions [12, 33, 57] featuring oblivious memory access to defend such attacks. On the other hand, such integration inevitably incurs extra overhead, and we leave as a future study whether a sweet spot can be found in achieving good balance between security and performance.
IMPLEMENTATION AND INSTANTIATION OF LIGHTBOX 6.1 Implementation
We implemented a fully functional prototype of LightBox with around 5200 lines of C code 4 . We use AES-CTR and CMAC for required encryption and authentication, and SHA256 for cryptographic hash. All three functions are provided in the trusted crypto library shipped with SGX SDK. LightBox runtime contains one normal thread, and one trusted thread running enclave binary. The implementation is centered around the four LightBox modules.
In SAdmin, the standard SGX attestation procedure is implemented. We currently use a naive approach to distinguish the secure management channel and redirection tunnel, i.e., a flag in raw packet header. During initialization, SAdmin registers a few signal and event handlers, and the ones involving enclave, for example log flushing scheduler, are defined via ECALLs.
In SFerry, two queues are synchronized between the untrusted and trusted routine in main memory, for ingress and egress ferries 4 The glue code generated by SGX SDK for bridging enclave and host are not counted.
respectively. Raw packets received from network device are sometimes out-of-order; SFerry first reorders raw packets, and then inserts the reconstructed ferries into ingress queue. We have not implemented retransmission logic for packet loss, and we leave it as a future feature of our ongoing development. In our experiment environment, i.e., a dedicated LAN, we did not observe packet loss.
In StateEx, a region of contiguous enclave memory is reserved for state cache, whereas the capability of state stock is only limited by main memory. The cache and stock share same data structure for entry, which is designed in a generic way such that state of arbitrary type and size can be held without modification. In addition to state data, an entry maintains: indexes for fast lookup in cache and stock; pointers for LRU cache replacement; and a timestamp for flow expiration checking. StateEx also allocates contiguous memory blocks for bundle optimization and stream reassembly; this optimizes the data marshaling efficiency of OCALLs.
In SLog, log buffer flushing is triggered in two way. One is buffer overflow, and then an OCALL is made to flush the buffer out and append the content to log files, and this case is relatively rare. The other is by a scheduler running in host, which makes use of an ECALL to flush the buffer; note that in this case, the normal thread will transiently become a trusted thread. SLog keeps the buffer small, so that the flushing will not incur much cost. Currently we seal the log files on middlebox server, and we plan to send the files directly back to gateway in the future.
Instantiating LightBox for PRADS
We instantiate LightBox for a popular open source middlebox, PRADS [15] . Here we report our efforts for the instantiation and hence demonstrate LightBox's good compatibility.
PRADS's main functionality is to detect network services and assets in the traffic against predefined fingerprints or signatures, using string and regex matching. It has a neat design and code structure that conforms to the model discussed in §4.2. Each packet will be first flow-tracked, and then passed through a sequence of detection modules, along which the detected services or assets are updated and logged.
PRADS uses libpcap for packet I/O, and we replace this part with SFerry (libpcap still underlies the I/O). The remaining part of PRADS are directly ported into enclave. The only dependent third-party library is libpcre, and so we built libpcre as a trusted library at our disposal. 5 As for logging, PRADS's extensible output design allows us to easily make SLog a plug-and-play module.
PRADS's flow tracking code is perfectly substituted by StateEx, except that it tracks per-connection state, which can be regarded as a sum of the two bidirectional flow state between client and server. Nonetheless, this makes no difference in terms of StateEx's functionality nor the overall magnitude of flow. Apart from flow states, PRADS also maintains state data for detected assets; we leave the latter entirely inside enclave, as it is much smaller in size and does not scale with the number of flow tracked. Note that it is easy to configure StateEx to handle the asset states, if necessary. PRADS does not perform stream reassembly.
The vanilla PRADS contains around 15200 lines of C code, and our instantiation of LightBox for it adds in about 760 lines of C code, 5 Trusted libraries are static libraries that can be linked with SGX enclave binary. i.e., only 5% inflation. About half of the added code are for initialization, and another quarter for verbose logging. Such instantiation effort is well acceptable in practice. General guidelines. In general, porting an existing middlebox to a LightBox instance requires 1) compiling dependent code into trusted library, 2) adapting LightBox modules into original middlebox, 3) preparing LightBox manifest files, and finally 4) building and testing the instance. All these can be normally finished within one thousand lines of code. On the other hand, a fresh middlebox project can incorporate LightBox into its design and development in the first place, which completely eliminates the porting effort. Finally, a LightBox instance can be readily deployed to a SGXenabled commodity server, without extra hardware or software requirement.
EVALUATIONS
The evaluation is composed of two parts: practicality evaluation ( §7.
2), where we analyze the systems' overall performance, as well as detailed component-wise computation overhead, under different network scenarios; parameterized evaluation ( §7.3), where we fine tune the parameters of LightBox so as to find out the practically optimal ones that fully boost the system.
Experimental setup
Three systems are tested in the experiments: vanilla PRADS as the baseline, a direct porting of PRADS into SGX (PRADS-SGX), and our LightBox instance of PRADS (LightBox). The default configuration files of PRADS are used for all systems. We regard per-ferry latency as the key performance indicator, since the basic processing unit is a ferry. For vanilla PRADS, we equates processing a ferry to processing a batch of packets in plaintext. The ferry size is set to 1000 unless otherwise stated. We report the latency of aggregated ferry, which is averaged over multiple consecutive ferries. PRADS has per-flow state of 124B, which is small among popular middleboxes. We pad the state to 512B, or it is hard to maintain millions of concurrent flows to overload enclave memory in the experiments; the padding helps illustrate the systems' performance under more realistic environments. LightBox's state cache is configured to 8MB unless otherwise stated. PRADS-SGX is allowed to use as much enclave memory as needed via SGX's paging utility.
We use two real packet traces and live traffic in the tests. The live traffic is generated using tcpkali [35] between two servers, one as gateway and the other middlebox, with concurrent connections transmitting random payload bytes. Tab.1 summarizes the traffic dataset. For CAIDA trace we use the first 50M packets.
All experiments are conducted on servers with Intel E3-1505 v5 CPU (2.8GHz) and 16GB memory, running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and SGX SDK v1.8. We use gcc 5.4.0 to compile the SGX projects. The enclave memory is set to the maximum 128MB (90MB usable).
Practicality evaluation
We investigate LightBox's practicality by answering the questions:
• How much security overhead is incurred by SGX?
• Can the systems survive from heavy load?
• Where does the overhead actually come from? 7.2.1 Overall system performance. Fig.5 reports the processing latency of aggregated ferry for m57 trace. We can see that LightBox brings small overhead to vanilla PRADS; over time, the latency is increased by 1-4ms per ferry, or 1-4µs per packet. The overhead brought by PRADS-SGX is not too much either, with 1-8ms latency inflation. Note that here PRADS-SGX is not penalized by secure paging, because the memory consumed by it for flow state is 512B × 91K = 45MB, which is just half of the total available enclave memory. The result also suggests that most middlebox code can run in enclave at nearly native speed.
The systems' performance for live traffic is compared in Fig.6 . We record the data when all connections are established. Since packets are of fixed size, we are more interested in distribution (CDF) than individual point. From the graph, LightBox's overhead for large packets is slightly higher than for small packets, which owns to the increased cost for loading packets to enclave; nonetheless, the overhead is always well within 5ms. In contrast, PRADS-SGX adds over 10ms latency for small packets. Note that PRADS-SGX does not reach EPC limit either, so the source of its cost should mainly come from OCALLs needed for networking. On the other hand, the cost for large packets is not dominated by networking but major middlebox functions, hence presenting relatively small overhead.
We conclude that the overall security overhead introduced by SGX, within its capability (i.e., low traffic volume and low flow amount), is practically small, especially with LightBox's designs. 
Stress test.
Now we turn to more stressful cases. Small packets (64B) are used here, otherwise our servers cannot handle that huge volume of traffic. The result is given in Fig.8 , from which vast difference between the two systems can be observed.
Both systems' latency increases with the number of tracked flows, since more flows means longer lookup time. However, LightBox's performance is extremely stable: its latency scales (approximately) linearly with the number of flows, and even in the face of 600K flows, it can finish 95% of the ferries in 10ms. This proves StateEx's caching efficiency. On the other hand, PRADS-SGX suffers from severe performance degradation after 200K flows, where the consumed memory just exceeds the EPC limit. We find that 50% of the ferries are finished in 15-55ms for 400K flows, and in 22-90ms for 600K flows; the distributions are uniform in these intervals. It is foreseeable that as more flows are tracked, the distribution will further shift to the right.
We also measure the peak enclave memory footprint, as listed in Tab.2. As expected, LightBox consumes constant and small amount of enclave memory whatever tracked flows, but PRADS-SGX consumes as much enclave memory as the flows. When middlebox maintains larger state, PRADS-SGX's memory footprint will further enlarge, hence worse performance. In conclusion, on one hand, PRADS-SGX's prohibitive performance manifests our concern in §2.3; on the other hand, LightBox's stable and high performance evinces its strong sustainability under extreme cases.
Performance decomposition analysis.
We further check what exactly contribute to the overhead. We decompose the processing into three parts: networking (packet I/O, reordering and retransmission), flow tracking, and the rest main functions. Fig.7 shows the decomposition for three cases. Fig.7a and 7b reinforce the observations and analyses presented in §7.2.1. That is, networking and flow tracking do not dominate the entire computation. We can see that larger packets (1500B) takes more networking time than smaller ones (avg. 838B), while the majority of time is still taken by major middlebox function. Indeed, we did not notice any packet loss in our experiment environment, and we only notice a few out-of-order cases. The difference in networking performance between LightBox and PRADS-SGX should be more noticeable in practical environment. Also observable from the figures is that small flow concurrency leads to negligible flow tracking time in m57 trace and live traffic with 10K connections. Fig.7c corresponds to the stress test in §7.2.2. Here, packet is very small (64B) but flow concurrency is quite high (600K). As expected, middlebox processing is now dominated by flow tracking. Interestingly, the latency exhibits certain periodicity, especially for PRADS-SGX. This is explained by the somewhat regular transmission pattern, i.e. fixed packet rate, in our synthetic live traffic. For real traffic, PRADS-SGX may be much worse.
To conclude, LightBox can maintain packet latency on the magnitude of 1-10µs while tracking millions of flows, which is on a par with common middlebox processing delay. The overhead incurred by LightBox becomes less significant in more complex middlebox.
Parameterized evaluation
We tune important system parameters of LightBox and examine how they impact overall performance. All experiments in this section use CAIDA trace, which contains header-only packets.
7.3.1 Practical ferry unit. We adjust ferry size and plot in Fig.3 the processing latency against varied sizes. As can be seen, there exists an approximately linear correlation between latency and ferry size (between lines). However, the best ferry size appears in the interval [500, 2000] . If the size is too large, the linear trend will be elevated, i.e., latency will inflate more; for example, the 5000-line is clearly higher than a 5-time multiplication of the 1000-line. Note that large ferry will also burden enclave memory. Contrarily, if the size is too small, networking cost cannot be properly amortized. In summary, we suggest 1000 ferry size for practical use.
7.3.2 Cache performance. Now we present detailed analysis for LightBox's caching performance. First, we plot PRADS-SGX's performance as baseline in Fig.11 . Not surprisingly, the latency of PRADS-SGX inflates dramatically with the number of tracked flows. When the flow amount reaches 900K, it takes about 250ms to process a ferry, i.e., 250µs per packet. The latency tends to grow exponentially as more flows are accumulated.
The results for LightBox are plotted in Fig.9 . Apart from latency data, we also draw the associated cache statistics, which is calculated over each ferry. Miss rate represent the true cache miss rate; in other words, it is obtained from processing the packets in a row, where later packet belonging to the same flow of a previous missed one will not be double counted. Bundle rate, in reverse, counts cache miss multiple times, even if the state should have been swapped in upon the first miss without bundle optimization. Obviously bundle rates ≥ miss rate always holds. A large gap between the two will imply bundle optimization is unnecessary. From  Fig.9a we can see that with 8M cache, LightBox already outperforms PRADS-SGX by 2-3 orders of magnitude; per ferry latency is well within 4ms. Yet, larger cache brings insignificant performance gain. From 8M to 16M, the latency decreases by 0.1-0.5ms; from 16M to 24M, the decrease is even less. The change of rates follow the same trend. The miss rate reduces from 19% to 10%, and then to 9%. The gap between bundle rate and miss rate is small, and it closes up as cache size increases, which justifies the effectiveness of bundle optimization.
To sum up, 8-16M state cache should suit practical use well, and by this 100×-1000× or more performance gain can be obtained over naive paging-based approach.
RELATED WORKS
Secure outsourced middleboxes. The list of works securing outsourced middlebox is growing. Early attempts [25, 55] protects the privacy of middlebox rules against public cloud, but leaves packet contents in cleartext. Sherry et al. [54] develop the first privacy-preserving DPI system which protects both rules and packets. Thereafter come a line of dedicated designs [6, 31, 38, 65] on tailored cryptographic primitives; they cover more middlebox functions, enhance system security, and explore different deployment choices. Fayazbakhsh et al. [14] initiate the discussion of protecting integrity or correctness of outsourced middlebox; they sketch a framework to make the remote processing locally verifiable by replaying attested logs. Recently, Yuan et al. [64] devise probabilistic checking schemes to assure pattern matching based network functions with high confidence. The above works cannot fulfill all desired requirements, as discussed before.
Other SGX-enabled systems. A plethora of systems have been built upon SGX since its advent. Notable ones include data analytics platforms [13, 41, 51, 67] ; system service/container/sandbox [5, 9, 19, 42, 57, 58] ; specific applications like smart contract [66] , Tor network [28] , content-based routing [45] , and many others. Most relevant to ours are the system-level support for legacy programs [9, 58] , secure container [5] and sandbox [19] , because in principle they can secure a wide spectrum of programs and hence possibly middlebox as well. However, as we have discussed, the unique challenges faced by middlebox have seldom been explored before, and directly applying these systems will lead to prohibitive performance overhead.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present LightBox, a system for secure and trustworthy middlebox outsourcing, built on top of SGX. LightBox allows enterprise to outsource generic middlebox functionality with minimal development and deployment effort. The outsourced middlebox can run at near-native speed, even under extremely heavy load. Our work significantly contributes to the road map of secure middlebox.
